Integrating With What You Already Run

A PAM system that stands alone becomes a separate process nobody follows. The integrations determine whether it is part of how work happens.

Identity provider

Authentication to the broker through the existing identity provider, with the existing multi-factor requirement.

Group membership driving entitlements, so access is granted through the same mechanism as everything else.

Deprovisioning that reaches the broker, which is the offboarding requirement and the most commonly missed.

Conditional access policies applied, including device requirements.

Without this join, PAM becomes a second identity system with its own lifecycle and its own orphaned accounts.

Ticketing and change management

A ticket reference on the access request, validated where possible.

Automatic approval for access matching an approved change, which removes most of the friction argument at a stroke.

The session linked to the ticket, so a later review has the context.

Change records showing which privileged session implemented them.

This is the integration that makes approval proportionate, because the approval already happened in the change process.

Logging and detection

Session metadata and command events to the central logging platform, not only to the broker's own console.

Alerts routed into the existing detection pipeline rather than into a separate queue nobody watches.

Correlation with endpoint and network telemetry, which is where a privileged session in isolation becomes an investigation.

Broker logs shipped off-box to a destination broker administrators cannot alter.

Configuration management

Onboarding new hosts automatically, so the programme keeps up with the estate.

Authorised key files owned by configuration management, so manual additions revert.

Local administrator group membership enforced, so drift is corrected rather than discovered.

Agent deployment through the existing mechanism.

The asset inventory

Systems in the PAM inventory joined to the organisation's asset register, so coverage can be measured against a denominator that is not the PAM system's own list.

Ownership shared rather than maintained twice.

New systems flagged for onboarding at build time.

What integration prevents

A second inventory that disagrees with the first.

Orphaned entitlements when someone leaves.

Approval fatigue, because most requests are pre-authorised by an existing change.

Alerts nobody sees.

Coverage claims measured against the wrong denominator, which is the most common way a programme overstates itself.

The order

Identity first, because everything else depends on it.

Logging second, because it is cheap and immediately useful.

Ticketing third, because it removes the friction that causes bypassing.

Configuration management fourth.

Asset inventory last, and it is the one that makes honest reporting possible.

The offboarding join

The integration most often missed, and the one an auditor samples.

Departure in the HR system triggers a task list, generated from the privileged account inventory.

Directory and broker access removed automatically.

Standing grants revoked.

Owned accounts reassigned, which requires the ownership field to be populated.

SSH keys removed, which requires the key inventory joined to the directory.

Shared credentials rotated, for anything the person knew.

Completion recorded, because the evidence is what the sample asks for.

Logs the broker administrators cannot alter

The property that turns a log into evidence.

Shipped immediately, not batched at session end.

To a destination outside the broker's administrative boundary.

Written to storage the source cannot modify or delete.

With integrity protection, so alteration is detectable.

Access to the destination separately controlled and itself audited.

Alert on the shipping stopping, which is the failure that produces a quiet gap exactly when an attacker with broker access would want one.